James V. Neel, one of the leading human geneticists of the 21st Century, has long been concerned about the consequences of human overpopulation and the accompanying destruction of the earth's ecosystem. His point of view, summarized in this paper, is contrasted with some recent optimistic projections presented by demographers and population biologists who believe the population bomb has been defused by evidence of a decrease in worldwide fertility along with a significant increase in food production. The authors of this paper (...) are not so optimistic and see a continuing need for concern rather than complacency based on ever increasing human wants and aspirations together with the minimal results of recent environmental summits. The case of HIV/aids is used to illustrate the evolutionary implications of the interaction between population dynamics and genetic change based on the concepts of population bottlenecks, genetic drift and founder effects. What becomes evident from this illustration is that epidemics by viral and other pathogens in the 21st Century can affect the size of human populations and thereby the course of the species' evolutionary makeup. The potential of evolutionary medicine and in particular molecular biology to improve our prediction capabilities and modulate some of the possible consequences is discussed. (shrink)

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: _An Introduction to Modal Logic_ and _A Companion to Modal Logic_. _A New Introduction to Modal Logic_ is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes (...) readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic. (shrink)

' I heartily recommend it to any philosopher of language interested in the issues. [] Logicians, of course, will want to savour the whole thing.' Australian Journal of Philosophy, 71:3 (1993).

The growth of knowledge and its effects on the practice of medicine have been issues of philosophical and ethical interest for several decades and will remain so for many years to come. The outline of the present volume was conceived nearly three years ago. In 1987, a conference on this theme was held in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on the occasion of the founding of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care (ESPMH). Most of the chapters of this (...) book are derived from papers presented at that meeting, and for the purpose of editing the book Stuart Spicker, Ph. D., joined two founding members of ESPMH, Henk ten Have and Gerrit Kimsma. The three of them successfully brought together a number of interesting contribu tions to the theme, and ESPMH is grateful and proud to have initiated the production of this volume. The Society intends that annual meetings be held in different European countries on a rotating basis and to publish volumes related to these meetings whenever feasible. In 1988, the second conference was held in Aarhus, Denmark on "Values in Medical Decision Making and Resource Allocation in Health Care". In 1989, a meeting was held in Czestochowa, Poland, on "European Traditions in Philosophy of Medicine. From Brentano to Bieganski". It is hoped that these conferences and the books to be derived from them, will initiate a new European tradition, lasting well into the 21 st century! P. J. (shrink)

Papers presented at the Conference of the Cardinal Newman Society, November, 2001, the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

Truth of x (independently of any description of x) that it is f. A property f which holds of x but is not per se of x is said to hold per accidens of x. The essence of an individual is the sum of its per se properties. We can formulate the following: doctrine a: concrete individuals do not have essences though abstract entities do. Doctrine b: concrete individuals have essences but they do not individuate, whereas abstract entities have essences (...) which do individuate. Assumption i: we shall say that a thing exists insofar as it has an essence. Assumption ii: we shall say that we know a thing when we know what its per se properties are. We argue that plato held doctrine a and aristotle doctrine b (with assumptions i and ii). (edited). (shrink)

Health care reform poses numerous challenges. A core challenge is to make health care more efficient and effective without causing more harm than benefit. Additionally, those fashioning health-care policy must encourage patients to exercise caution and restraint when expending scarce resources; restrict the ability of politicians to advance their careers by promising alluring but costly entitlements, many of which they will not be able to deliver; face the demographic challenges of an aging population; and avoid regulations that create significant inefficiencies (...) and restrict access to health care. Given such real-world challenges, how should health care be reformed in the United States or elsewhere? This number of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy examines many of the complex issues that must be considered in reforming a health-care system. (shrink)

A (normal) system of propositional modal logic is said to be complete iff it is characterized by a class of (Kripke) frames. When we move to modal predicate logic the question of completeness can again be raised. It is not hard to prove that if a predicate modal logic is complete then it is characterized by the class of all frames for the propositional logic on which it is based. Nor is it hard to prove that if a propositional modal (...) logic is incomplete then so is the predicate logic based on it. But the interesting question is whether a complete propositional modal logic can have an incomplete extension. In 1967 Kripke announced the incompleteness of a predicate extension of S4. The purpose of the present article is to present several such systems. In the first group it is the systems with the Barcan Formula which are incomplete, while those without are complete. In the second group it is those without the Barcan formula which are incomplete, while those with the Barcan Formula are complete. But all these are based on propositional systems which are characterized by frames satisfying in each case a single first-order sentence. (shrink)

It is suggested that the anatomical structures whichmediate consciousness evolved as decisiveembellishments to a (non-conscious) design strategypresent even in the simplest monocellular organisms.Consciousness is thus not the pinnacle of ahierarchy whose base is the primitive reflex, becausereflexes require a nervous system, which the monocelldoes not possess. By postulating that consciousness isintimately connected to self-paced probing of theenvironment, also prominent in prokaryotic behavior,one can make mammalian neuroanatomy amenable todramatically simple rationalization.

As a first comment it should not be taken that we have any argument against the consistency of Mellor’s actualist version of the B-theory. Not only have we no argument; we hold that Mellor’s position is consistent. As far as logic goes we believe that you can translate A into B, and B into A. Mellor takes a quotation from our article as endorsing the policy of doing for time just what you do for modality, and vice versa, and it (...) is true that you can take our sentence that way. It is also true that we are sympathetic to an equal treatment of these two, but it is important to acknowledge that nothing in the logic forces you to do this. In particular, we agree with Mellor that practically no one treats space in an A-theory manner – even though it is logically consistent to do so. Our concern is solely with Mellor’s argument that a certain position in the temporal case is inconsistent where the analogous modal position is not. And our paper is addressed not so much to Mellor’s own position as to an A-theorist who wants to escape the consequences of Mellor’s argument by doing for time what Mellor does for modality. In fact, there is a position against which Mellor’s argument is successful. As far as we can tell the version we shall present is, if not precisely what Mellor has in mind, close to it, or at least sufficiently like it to illustrate his reply in a form in which we are able to comment on it. Mellor’s example is of Jim who …. (shrink)